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ESSAY 
PLEADING STANDARDS AFTER BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 
V. TWOMBLY 
Scott Dodson* 
N May 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly1 and gutted the venerable language from 
Conley v. Gibson that every civil procedure professor and student 
can recite almost by heart: that “a complaint should not be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitled him to relief.”2 This Essay explains how Bell 
Atlantic did so and discusses some of its implications for pleading 
claims in the future. 
THE DECISION 
In Bell Atlantic, representatives of a putative class of local tele-
phone and internet service subscribers sued a group of local tele-
phone line operators for antitrust violations under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.3 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the defendants 
conspired to restrain trade by inflating charges for the services in 
“parallel conduct.” The plaintiffs also alleged that the conduct 
arose from an “agreement” between the defendants. 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. 
1 Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
2 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
O 
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act does prohibit unlawful agreements 
to restrain trade. But, a critical element of Section 1 violations is 
the existence of an “agreement”; independent conduct that results 
in a restraint of trade is not prohibited by Section 1. Before Bell 
Atlantic, the Court had not explained what role “parallel conduct” 
allegations might play at the pleading stage. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6). The district court agreed and dismissed the case. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, but the 
Supreme Court, per Justice Souter, then reversed the Second Cir-
cuit and ordered the case dismissed.4 
The Court first explained that Conley v. Gibson’s requirement 
that the complaint “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” is critical.5 
“[G]rounds,” the Court wrote, “requires more than labels and con-
clusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a case of ac-
tion will not do.”6 In short, some factual allegations must accom-
pany the elements of a claim. 
To state a Section 1 claim, the Court reasoned, that means that 
the plaintiff must allege facts “plausibly” suggesting the existence 
of a conspiracy. This “plausibility” standard, while not a “probabil-
ity” standard, requires “enough fact to raise a reasonable expecta-
tion that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”7 
The Court then explained that the need for additional fact plead-
ing is particularly necessary in antitrust litigation because antitrust 
discovery—especially antitrust class action discovery—can be po-
tentially massive and expensive. Because “the threat of discovery 
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic 
cases,” the requirement of fact pleading is necessary to weed out, 
at the pleading stage, those cases “with no reasonably founded 
hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence to 
support a [Section] 1 claim.”8 
The Court noted that Conley had famously stated that “a com-
plaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
                                                          
4 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. 
5 Id. at 1964. 
6 Id. at 1965. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 1967 (internal quotations omitted). 
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support of his claim which would entitled him to relief.”9 But the 
Court disavowed an isolated interpretation, saying instead that the 
phrase means that a plaintiff can rely on facts not stated in the 
complaint to provide his claims; it does not set a minimum pleading 
standard. 
Applying this standard, the Court found the allegations insuffi-
cient to survive a motion to dismiss and therefore reversed the 
Second Circuit’s opinion.10 
Justice Stevens, joined in large part by Justice Ginsburg, dis-
sented and would have allowed the claim to proceed on limited 
discovery.11 Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens would have fol-
lowed Conley’s “no set of facts” standard. All that should be re-
quired, according to Justice Stevens, is notice of a viable claim. The 
Conley standard, he wrote, “reflects a philosophy that, unlike in 
the days of code pleading, separating the wheat from the chaff is a 
task assigned to the pretrial and trial process.”12 In his view, the al-
legations satisfied the pleading standards of Rule 8. 
Justice Stevens said that the majority’s concerns of costly and 
perhaps fruitless discovery could have been ameliorated through 
careful case supervision. He also pointed out that requiring addi-
tional facts suggesting a conspiracy will be particularly difficult for 
antitrust plaintiffs. In such cases, facts are often held exclusively by 
the defendant, and dismissals prior to discovery prevent the plain-
tiff from discovering those facts.13 
SOME COMMENTARY 
Bell Atlantic is a significant statement from the Court from a 
proceduralist perspective (even if perhaps unremarkable from an 
antitrust perspective). The Supreme Court had cited to the “no set 
of facts” language in Conley twelve times in controlling opinions, 
and many lower courts had adhered to it and its liberal notice-
pleading standard. For example, just a few weeks ago, Judge 
Easterbrook wrote for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago: “[A] judicial order 
                                                          
9 Id. at 1968. 
10 Id. at 1974. 
11 Id. at 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
13 Id. at 1986–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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dismissing a complaint because the plaintiff did not plead facts has 
a short half-life. Any decision declaring ‘this complaint is deficient 
because it does not allege X’ is a candidate for summary reversal, 
unless X is on the list in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).”14 The Seventh and 
other circuits will now have to change their pleading jurisprudence. 
The question, though, is what that change will look like. What 
does Bell Atlantic really mean? Clearly, Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language is dead, at least as to the meaning that was customarily 
ascribed to it. And, at least for the kinds of costly class action anti-
trust cases like the one initiated by Twombly, Bell Atlantic erects 
an additional “plausibility” requirement of fact pleading in its 
place, what I have called “notice-plus.”15 
But the Court’s opinion presages more expansive application. 
True, it relies on the detriments of costly but fruitless discovery, 
and one way to read Bell Atlantic is to limit it to the kinds of costly 
litigation at issue in that case. But his repudiation of the Conley 
“no set of facts” standard and his conclusion that Rule 8 requires 
more are not cabined by the costs and expenses that might accrue. 
The best reading of Bell Atlantic is that the new standard is abso-
lute, that mere notice pleading is dead for all cases and causes of 
action. Several courts have already interpreted it beyond antitrust,16 
and non-antitrust industries, such as those whose views are repre-
sented on the Drug and Device Law blog,17 are suggesting the 
same. 
Safeguarding defendants from meritless strike suits is all fine and 
good. But using fact pleading standards to do so is problematic. 
Antitrust plaintiffs often do not possess evidence of an agreement 
to conspire, and requiring such evidence prior to discovery may 
prevent them from ever having it. It may be that Twombly did not 
allege more facts because he simply did not have them yet, not be-
                                                          
14 Vincent v. City Colls. of Chicago, 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quo-
tations omitted). 
15 Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2007/05/prof_scott_dods.html (May 21, 
2007). 
16 See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 2007 WL 1717803, *8–*11 (2d Cir. 2007) (constitutional 
civil rights); Hicks v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 2007 WL 1577841, *2 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(wrongful discharge). 
17 Posting of James M. Beck and Mark Herrmann to Drug and Device Law, 
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/05/long-overdue-retirement-for-
anything.html (May 31, 2007, 04:31 EST). 
  
2007] Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 139 
cause they did not exist. This “information asymmetry,” as Profes-
sor Randy Picker calls it,18 undermines the Court’s suspicions that 
the pleading standard only will bar cases that have no “reasonably 
founded hope” of “reveal[ing] relevant evidence” in discovery.19 
On the contrary, the Court’s standard is likely to bar many anti-
trust cases (and mass tort, discrimination, and a host of other cases) 
with merit. 
Professor Michael Dorf has suggested that the case can be 
viewed as simply reiterating the rule that plaintiffs can plead them-
selves out of court.20 If a plaintiff chooses to rely merely on parallel 
conduct, then (even if true) she cannot get relief, and so her com-
plaint must be dismissed. But, if she instead pleads in the alterna-
tive, her complaint should go forward because she has not limited 
herself to a theory upon which no relief could be granted. 
That reading would narrow Bell Atlantic’s reach, but there are 
several reasons why it seems unlikely. First, the Court seems to 
disavow this reading when it writes that “once a claim has been 
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”21 Second, this in-
terpretation would tend to penalize plaintiffs for providing more 
notice to the defendant rather than less, which would be in some 
tension with the implicit import of the Court’s opinion suggesting 
the need for more supporting material. 
Still others have suggested that Erickson v. Pardus,22 a per cu-
riam summary decision released just a week later, mitigates Bell 
Atlantic’s significance.23 In Erickson, a prisoner asserted a Sec-
tion 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment and alleged (1) that 
he had hepatitis C, (2) that he was on a one-year treatment pro-
gram for it, (3) that shortly after the program began the prison offi-
cials started withholding the treatment, and (4) that his life was in 
                                                          
18 Posting of Randy Picker to The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/05/closing_the_doo.html (May 21, 2007, 
16:45 EST). 
19 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1967. 
20 Dorf on Law, The End of Notice Pleading?, http://www.michaeldorf.org/ 
2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (May 24, 2007, 07:35 EST). 
21 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 
22 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007). 
23 Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/ 
archives/2007/06/more_on_yesterd_1.html (June 5, 2007, 17:10 EST) (discussing 
Erickson). 
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danger as a result.24 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado dismissed for failure to plead adequately the require-
ment of “substantial harm,” and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and cited Bell 
Atlantic for the proposition that the complaint need only “give the 
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.”25 In Erickson’s view, the prisoner provided such no-
tice and grounds in his allegations. 
Though the timing of Erickson is suspicious, I doubt it will tem-
per the import of Bell Atlantic. As I wrote earlier, Erickson was a 
“no-brainer” of a reversal under any Rule 8 pleading standard.26 
And, Erickson was a pro se plaintiff, and the Court acknowledged 
that the pleading standards are more liberal in such cases. Thus, 
Erickson’s facts are different from those of Bell Atlantic in ways 
that make the two decisions perfectly consistent. 
Indeed, Erickson reaffirmed Bell Atlantic’s requirement that the 
complaint provide notice plus grounds. If Erickson were meant to 
tell us that the Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic was not what it 
seemed, surely Justice Stevens’ dissent would have been written 
differently to explain his understanding that Bell Atlantic was not 
so remarkable. But instead Justice Stevens viewed Bell Atlantic as 
dramatically changing the playing field, and—in my view—
Erickson does not say otherwise. The two cases are looking at the 
same standard, just from worlds apart. 
True, Erickson does say that “specific facts are not necessary,”27 
but that was the case in Bell Atlantic, too. “Specific facts” refers to 
the particularized pleading reserved for Rule 9 claims. What Rule 8 
requires after both Erickson and Bell Atlantic are not specific facts, 
but sufficient facts such that the complaint as a whole makes a 
“showing” of entitlement to relief. 
In short, the best reading of Bell Atlantic is that Rule 8 now re-
quires notice-plus pleading for all cases (though especially for cases 
with costly discovery). It invites defendants to file motions to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(6) with greater frequency where the com-
                                                          
24 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2197–99. 
25 Id. at 2200. 
26 Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2007/06/dodson_on_erick.html (June 12, 
2007). 
27 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200. 
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plaint does not allege supporting facts, and it suggests that at least 
some of those motions should be granted with more regularity. 
SOME LINGERING QUESTIONS 
In addition to shifting the pleading landscape, Bell Atlantic raises 
new questions that will not be answered without more litigation. 
First, what will state courts do? Twenty-six states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia patterned their dismissal standards on the now-
repudiated “no set of facts” language from Conley. Bell Atlantic 
leaves those standards in limbo. They are free, of course, to refuse 
to follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law when 
the sole question is a matter of state law, but there may be much 
rethinking to be had in the state courts to the extent their state 
procedures are built upon a now-repudiated federal standard. 
Second, what is “plausible”? The Court made clear that the new 
pleading standard—at least in the antitrust context—was not a 
“probability” standard but only a “plausibility” standard. It adds 
some specific examples of factual assertions that “suggest” a con-
spiracy and thus would meet his plausibility test. But if the “plausi-
bility” standard extends beyond the antitrust context, then these 
examples are in tension with Form 9 and prior precedent. 
Form 9 of the appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
is a sample complaint for negligence, which states only: “On June 
1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against 
plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.”28 Form 9 certainly 
provides notice of the claim, but the bare allegation of “negligently 
drove” contains no inclination one way or another that the defen-
dant breached a duty. It is akin to a bare allegation of a “conspir-
acy” supported by factual allegations of parallel conduct. Requir-
ing more in the antitrust context is in some tension with the 
approved allegation of negligence in Form 9. 
Prior precedent also creates tension. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A., the Court upheld a Title VII claim making a bald allegation 
of termination because of national origin discrimination, coupled 
with dates and other scant factual details of the termination.29 To 
the extent Bell Atlantic’s plausibility standard applies, such a claim 
                                                          
28 Fed. R. Civ. P., App. of Forms, Form 9. 
29 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2001). 
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should have been dismissed because it lacked factual assertions 
that would have “suggested” the existence of a discriminatory mo-
tive instead of a lawful one. If Bell Atlantic does not change the re-
sult in Swierkiewicz, then it is difficult to understand exactly what 
the “plausibility” standard means. 
Third, who will determine (and under what standards) what is 
“plausible” or not? The Court relied on commentators’ examples 
and asserts that they would state a claim.30 May a defendant moving 
to dismiss support his motion with expert opinions that the plain-
tiffs’ allegations are not plausible? Must a plaintiff oppose the mo-
tion with his own expert’s contrary opinions? Must the trial court 
then convert the motion into one for summary judgment? The an-
swers are unclear. 
Fourth, Bell Atlantic could be read as imposing a new notice-
plus-grounds fact pleading standard across-the-board, of which the 
“plausibility” standard is merely an appropriate manifestation spe-
cifically for the antitrust context. If so, then what “grounds” are 
sufficient in other contexts? Bell Atlantic does not delineate what 
the “plus” might be in other contexts, and it therefore makes every 
complaint a test case on a motion to dismiss. This and the other 
questions left open are sure to lead to abundant litigation, if only to 
discern exactly what Bell Atlantic means. 
CONCLUSION 
So, one thing is certain after Bell Atlantic: it will spawn years of 
increased litigation. It encourages defendants to file motions to 
dismiss, both in the set of cases likely to be covered by its language, 
and also in the set less likely to be covered, if only to test its mean-
ing and limits. Some defendants in current cases whose motions to 
dismiss were denied before Bell Atlantic may renew their motions 
under the new standard. Motions to dismiss will change from chal-
lenges to the legal sufficiency of a complaint to those challenging 
the factual sufficiency. It remains to be seen what Bell Atlantic ul-
timately means, but it is likely that it will take “sprawling, costly, 
and hugely time-consuming” litigation to get there.31 
 
 
                                                          
30 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1972–73. 
31 Id. at 1967 n.6. 
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